Continued GPD lawsuit reading

This makes the third installment in my analysis and review of US District Court Judge Thomas D. Schroeder's orders on federal discrimination claims by black Greensboro police officers.

Previous installments here and here.

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Schroeder holds that the defendants’ motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended complaint are denied “on the merits as to each plaintiff’s equal protection claim.”

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Schroeder:

The court holds that plaintiffs have not plausibly stated a claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion into seclusion against Wade in her individual capacity, and this claim will be dismissed.


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Schroeder dismisses gross negligence claims against former police Chief David Wray and former Deputy Chief Randall Brady for the release of personnel information, apparently in reference to journalist Jerry Bledsoe’s “Cops in Black and White” series published in the Rhinoceros Times from 2006 to 2009.

Having considered plaintiffs’ pleadings, the court is unable to locate any factual allegations in either complaint plausibly stating a gross negligence claim based on the disclosure of protected information. For example, plaintiffs allege that Wray and Brady routinely disclosed unspecified personnel information about unidentified black officers to a news reporter.


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The summary of Schroeder’s order in regards to the individual defendants, not surprisingly, contains the essential significance of the decision:

The net effect of the court’s various rulings is that plaintiffs may file their proposed SAC as to, and may proceed on, the following claims: (1) plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against the city (Count 1); (2) plaintiffs’ hostile work environment claim under section 1981 against the GPD defendants in their individual capacities (Count II in part); (3) [Steve] Evans’ disparate treatment claim under section 1981 against the GPD defendants in their individual capacities (Count II in part); (4) [Lawrence] Alexander [Jr.]’s disparate discipline claim under section 1981 against the GPD defendants in their individual capacities (Count II in part); (5) plaintiffs’ equal protection claim under section 1983 against the GPD defendants in their individual capacities (Count V in part); (6) Hinson’s Fourth Amendment claim under section 1983 against the GPD defendants in their individual capacities (Count V in part); (7) Hinson’s invasion of privacy claim against the GPD defendants in their individual capacities (Count VI in part); and (8) plaintiffs’ tortuous interference claim against [Councilwoman Trudy] Wade in her individual capacity (Count VII in part).


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That concludes my reading of the orders on claims against individual defendants. I'll pick up where I left off on the orders on claims against the city of Greensboro after I take a break and attend to some other matters.


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Schroeder declines to dismiss a Title VII discrimination claim by plaintiff Willie Parker that the city contended was not filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within the prescribed time frame.

Some background on Parker’s allegation:

Parker filed his EEOC Intake Questionnaire on May 5, 2006. The questionnaire alleges that “for no apparent reason” Parker’s photograph was shown to citizens and these citizens were asked about Parker’s involvement in illegal activity and associations with a drug dealer.


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Disparate treatment claims made by Alexander and Evans may go forward. Schroeder writes, “The city apparently concedes that plaintiffs Alexander and Evans have alleged facts sufficient to state disparate treatment claims.”

5 comments:

Roch101 said...

"For example, plaintiffs allege that Wray and Brady routinely disclosed unspecified personnel information about unidentified black officers to a news reporter."

And? Is that it? What follows?

Jordan Green said...

That's on page 123 of the orders pertaining to individual defendants. The next sentence reads, "Such vague allegations do not plausibly show that any individual plaintiff is entitled to relief." Then the order immediately moves on to claims by Rankin and Patterson that Wray "improperly and maliciously" discussed confidential personnel information about them in June 2005.

I don't find any support support in the order for Judge Schroeder's finding that claims against Wray and Brady for gross negligence are dismissed. The order doesn't shed any light on his basis for doing so. That said, I hold a professional bias towards former employees being able to talk to reporters without fear of repercussion.

Roch101 said...

Thanks, Jordan. I think the judge's finding that that allegation was vague and implausible is important.

Sincerely, thanks for doing the best reporting on this particular part of a complicated story.

Jon A Firebaugh said...

Jordan:
"I don't find any support support in the order for Judge Schroeder's finding that claims against Wray and Brady for gross negligence are dismissed."

How about lack of evidence? When an allegation is termed "vague" by a judge, that means there is a lack of specific evidence. I don't think that's a difficult concept.

Jordan Green said...

Jon: It seems to me that Judge Schroeder might have asked the plaintiffs to provide evidence to support their claim. I haven't followed every development in the James-Fulmore libel suit against Bledsoe and the Rhino, but such evidence might be found there.

I find it interesting that when reviewing most of the claims the judge goes to great pains to explain the rationale for either dismissing them or allowing them to go forward, and in some instances treats the plaintiffs claims with serious consideration. In this case, he doesn't expend much ink justifying his decision.

Maybe he's a supporter of press freedom, and doesn't want to set any precedent eroding journalists' ability to get information from sources without fear of having to compromise pledges of confidentiality.